


[Pdf free] The Source of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the world wars (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

The Source of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the world wars (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

Von Barry R. Posen

**Download PDF | ePub | DOC | audiobook | ebooks*



 Download

 Read Online

Produktinformation -Verkaufsrang: #1255365 in eBooksVerffentlicht am: 2014-09-09Erscheinungsdatum: 2014-09-09File Name: B00NGFKSDA | File size: 76.Mb

Von Barry R. Posen : The Source of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the world wars (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised The Source of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the world wars (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs):

KundenrezensionenHilfreichste Kundenrezensionen0 von 0 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. Why Organizational Theory Does Not Explain Military DoctrineVon Ein KundeBarry Posen's work is a comparison of 33 hypotheses drawn from organizational theory and balance of power theory. The test of these hypotheses is the military strategy of interwar France, Germany and Great Britain. While Posen's work has great explanatory value for the formation of military doctrine, what it does in actuality is refute the richness of organizational theory for explaining the sources of military doctrine. The problem is that Posen did not seemingly intend to refute organizational theory. The book offers a well balanced response to the work of Jack Snyder on the ideology of offensive military strategy. I would highly encourage graduate students and faculty of international relations and military science to read this work.

KurzbeschreibungBarry R. Posen explores how military doctrine takes shape and the role it plays in grand strategy—that collection of military, economic, and political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve security. Posen isolates three crucial elements of a given strategic doctrine: its offensive, defensive, or deterrent characteristics, its integration of military resources with political aims, and the degree of military or operational innovation it contains. He then examines these components of doctrine from the perspectives of organization theory and balance of power theory, taking into account the influence of technology and geography. Looking at interwar France, Britain, and Germany, Posen challenges each theory to explain the German Blitzkrieg, the British air defense system, and the French Army's defensive doctrine often associated with the Maginot Line. This rigorous comparative study, in which the balance of power theory emerges as the more useful, not only allows us to discover important implications for the study of national strategy today, but also serves to sharpen our understanding of the origins of World War II.

Pressestimmen "This is a scholarly and conceptually ambitious work which seeks to explain how military doctrine takes place and its role in 'grand strategy.' The core of the study examines military doctrines in the interwar period, discussing the German blitzkrieg and British air defense system as successes, and the French army's Maginot Line doctrine as a great failure. Posen develops many intriguing ideas and theoretical insights, and debates those of his academic peers, in a rich volume that has to be studied as well as read."—Foreign Affairs

"This is a scholarly and conceptually ambitious work which seeks to explain how military doctrine takes place and its role in 'grand strategy.' The core of the study examines military doctrines in the interwar period, discussing the German blitzkrieg and British air defense system as successes, and the French army's Maginot Line doctrine as a great failure. Posen develops many intriguing ideas and theoretical insights, and debates those of his academic peers, in a rich volume that has to be studied as well as read." Foreign Affairs

"This is a scholarly and conceptually ambitious work which seeks to explain how military doctrine takes place and its role in 'grand strategy.' The core of the study examines military doctrines in the interwar period, discussing the German blitzkrieg and British air defense system as successes, and the French army's Maginot Line doctrine as a great failure. Posen develops many intriguing ideas and theoretical insights, and debates those of his academic peers, in a rich volume that has to be studied as well as read."—Foreign Affairs

KurzbeschreibungBarry R. Posen explores how military doctrine takes shape and the role it plays in grand strategy—that collection of military, economic, and political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve security. Posen isolates three crucial elements of a given strategic doctrine: its offensive, defensive, or deterrent characteristics, its integration of military resources with political aims, and the degree of military or operational innovation it contains. He then examines these components of doctrine from the perspectives of organization theory and balance of power theory, taking into account the influence of technology and geography. Looking at interwar France, Britain, and Germany, Posen challenges each theory to explain the German Blitzkrieg, the British air defense system, and the French Army's defensive doctrine often associated with the Maginot Line. This rigorous comparative study, in which the balance of power theory emerges as the more useful, not only allows us to discover important implications for the study of national strategy today, but also serves to sharpen our understanding of the origins of World War II.