


(Free and download) Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (English Edition)

Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (English Edition)

Von Charles Edward Callwell

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Von Charles Edward Callwell : Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (English Edition) before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (English Edition):

KundenrezensionenHilfreichste Kundenrezensionen2 von 2 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. For Armchair KitchenersVon E. T. VealWritten early in the 20th Century to teach British officers how to wage war against

non-European armies in Asia and Africa, "Small Wars" retains its fascination at century's end. In fact, many of its lessons could well be applied to conflicts today. The author served in the Second Afghan and both Boer Wars, was an assiduous student of warfare around the globe and retired as a Major General after heading the British Army's Intelligence division during the Great War. The breadth of his knowledge is shown by the range of examples that illustrate the principles laid down in his book. The chapter on "Feints", for instance, draws on actions from the Zulu Wars, the Indian Mutiny, the 1821 Wallachian insurrection against the Ottoman Empire, the Second Afghan War, the Kaffir War of 1878, the French occupation of Algeria, the British expedition against Abyssinia in 1868, the siege of Khartoum, the suppression of Riel's revolt in Canada, the war against the Mahdi and a couple of Indian campaigns. Elsewhere, we are presented with the Russians in Central Asia, the French in Tonkin, Dahomey and Madagascar, the U.S. cavalry against the Indians of the Great Plains, the British and French in China, and many more now-obscure imbroglios. The first several chapters lay down broad strategic principles, most of them flowing from the key insight that regular armies enjoy great tactical advantages over forces inferior in organization, arms, training and discipline but suffer equally great strategic handicaps. In a "small war", therefore, the more "advanced" power can easily lose, due to ignorance of the enemy, failure to formulate clear objectives or, worst of all, the pursuit of military objectives that do not contribute to the conflict's political goal. Erroneous strategy, Callwell warns again and again, leads to desultory, defensive war that exhausts the regulars' resources while merely exasperating rather than subduing their enemy. (The reader may draw his own contemporary parallels.) After the strategic foundation come discussions of operations and tactics from multiple perspectives: the character of the action (attack, defense, pursuit, retreat, feint, etc.), the terrain on which it is fought, and the types of troops that fight it (including such exotica as camel corps and the not-yet-dominant machine gun). The commander who mastered Callwell's course was prepared to force a mountain pass, assault a Boer laager or Sudanese zeriba, maneuver through a jungle or carry out any of the other varied tasks that circumstances might demand. Aside from the inherent interest of its variegated subject matter and its appeal to wargamers, "Small Wars" will prove illuminating to the reader who wishes to understand more fully what happened in colonial warfare and how and why European forces won and lost. It is one of those rare works that makes concrete the challenges and achievements of a bygone era.

Kurzbeschreibung This is the original manual for small wars, now known variously as guerrilla warfare, asymmetric combat, and low-intensity conflict. It was first published in 1896 as an analysis and how-to guide for the British Army as it fought to expand the boundaries of the British Empire. Its author, Major General Sir Charles Edward Callwell, collects and distills combat experience from a vast range of British, French, and Russian imperial campaigns and rebellions. Callwell then draws several universal small-war combat lessons that are still true today, including the need for boldness and vigor to keep irregular forces off-balance, the vital role of intelligence, the importance of seizing and holding important terrain (most often the high ground), and the final war-winning requirement to seize what the enemy prizes most. He also shows that technological superiority alone is not enough, and that logistics and supply can lock an army in place instead of freeing it. Some of the Afghanistan battlefields described in the book are still being fought over today, with much the same disparity in forces, over a century later it is impossible to miss the lessons of history in this classic work.

Table of Contents: I. Introduction. II. Causes of Small wars as affecting their Conditions. III. The Objective in Small Wars. IV. The Influence of Sea Power. V. Difficulties under which the Regular Forces labour as regards Intelligence. VI. The Influence of the Question of Supply upon Small Wars. VII. Boldness and Vigour the Essence of effectively conducting such Operations. VIII. Tactics favour the Regular Army while Strategy favours the Enemy. IX. To avoid desultory Warfare the Enemy must be brought to battle. X. Division of Force. XI. Lines of Communications. XII. Guerilla Warfare in General. XIII. Introductory Remarks with regard to Tactical Condition. XIV. Tactics of Attack. XV. Tactics of Defence. XVI. Pursuits and Retreats. XVII. The employment of Feints. XVIII. Surprises, Raids, and Ambuscades. XIX. Squares on the March, in Bivouac, and in Action. XX. Principles of Laager and Zeriba Warfare. XXI. Hill Warfare. XXII. Bush Warfare. XXIII. Infantry Tactics. XXIV. Cavalry and Mounted Infantry. XXV. Camel Corps. XXVI. Artillery Tactics. XXVII. Machine Guns. XXVIII. The Service of Security. XXIX. Night Operations. XXX. Defence Works.

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