


[Mobile pdf] How Robert E. Lee Lost the Civil War (English Edition)

How Robert E. Lee Lost the Civil War (English Edition)

Von Edward H. Bonekemper III
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Von Edward H. Bonekemper III : How Robert E. Lee Lost the Civil War (English Edition) before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised How Robert E. Lee Lost the Civil War (English Edition):

KundenrezensionenHilfreichste Kundenrezensionen0 von 0 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. Playing the Blame GameVon Ein KundeThe author makes many points in his work - most of them invalid. He either distorts

history or really doesn't understand. Neither is such a good thing. First, you can't compare the American Civil War with the Revolution or the Viet Nam War. There are far more differences than similarities. Why not compare World War Two to the Crusades or the Gulf War to the French and Indian War? As far as Lee's Virginiacentric view of the war - study his correspondence. There is a great deal of correspondence in regards to the Western Theater. He didn't ignore it. He was concerned about it, but, remember he was in command of the Army of Northern Virginia only until the bitter end. What should his priorities have been? His responsibility was to combatting the Army of the Potomac and defending Richmond and he rarely had enough troops to do that. So many historians miss that simple point that it's hard to take them seriously. They lose so much credibility. As this author did for me.0 von 0 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. Tantalizing Idea and Well WrittenVon Wanda L. WilsonI found Mr. Bonnekemper's theory as to the weaknesses of generalship as he applies it to General Robert E. Lee a refreshing new viewpoint. Author Bonnekemper has done his homework and authenticates well, the failings of General Lee's strategy and tactics. If one can get past their preconceived notions about the greatness of General Lee, this book makes a significant contribution to the study of the history of our Civil war. Mr. Bonnekemper does not degrade General Lee, he simply states the facts; that General Lee's excesses in committing troops to battle may well have resulted in opportunities lost. General Lee will always be revered as a fine gentleman, a man of honor, dignity and great personal courage. This book will not change that. It should be read for what it is, a scholarly contribution to the study of American history.

KurzbeschreibungThis book challenges the general view that Robert E. Lee was a military genius who staved off inevitable Confederate defeat against insurmountable odds. Instead, the author contends that Lee was primarily responsible for the South's loss in a war it could have won.His theory: The North had the burden of conquering the South, a huge defensible area consisting of eleven states. The South only had to play for a tie and only had to wear down the northern will to win (as insurgents did against superior forces in the American Revolution, the Chinese Communist takeover of China, and the Vietnam War). Specifically, the South had to hold on to its precious manpower resources and convince the North to vote Lincoln out of office in 1864.Instead, Lee unnecessarily went for the win, squandered his irreplaceable troops, and weakened his army so badly that military defeat became inevitable. Lee's army took 80,000 casualties in his first fourteen months of command-the same number of troops he inherited when he took command. This crucial period of the war extended from the Seven Days' Campaign, in which Lee's army went on the suicidal offensive almost every day for a week; Second Bull Run/Manassas, where the final offensive charge was costly; the Antietam Campaign, which Lee initiated on his own and almost cost him his army; Fredericksburg, a lesson in slaughter that Lee failed to learn; Chancellorsville, the "victory" that wasn't; and finally the disastrous Gettysburg Campaign, in which he took his army on the strategic offensive and seriously damaged its future utility. With the Confederacy outnumbered four-to-one in white men of fighting age, Lee's aggressive strategy and tactics proved to be suicidal.Also noteworthy are Lee's failure to take charge of the battlefield (such as the second day of Gettysburg), his overly complex and ineffective battle-plans (such as the Antietam and Seven Days' campaigns), and his vague and ambiguous orders (such as those that deprived him of Jeb Stuart's services for most of Gettysburg).Furthermore, the book describes how Lee's Virginia-first myopia played a major role in crucial Confederate failures in the West. Too little attention has been paid to Lee's refusals to provide reinforcements for Vicksburg or Tennessee in mid-1863, his causing James Longstreet to arrive at Chickamauga with only a third of his troops and none of his artillery, his idea to move Longstreet away from Chattanooga just before Grant's troops broke through the undermanned Confederates at Missionary Ridge, and his failure to reinforce Atlanta in the critical months before the 1864 Presidential election.Lee's final failure was his continuing the hopeless and bloody slaughter after Union victory had been ensured by each of a series of events: the fall of Atlanta, the reelection of Lincoln, and the fall of Petersburg and Richmond.This book also explores historians' treatment of Lee, including the deification of him by failed Confederate generals, such as Jubal A. Early and William Nelson Pendleton, attempting to resurrect their own reputations and restore the pride of the South through creation of the Myth of the Lost Cause.Readers and listeners are not neutral about this stinging critique of the hero of The Lost Cause.KurzbeschreibungThis book challenges the general view that Robert E. Lee was a military genius who staved off inevitable Confederate defeat against insurmountable odds. Instead, the author contends that Lee was primarily responsible for the South's loss in a war it could have won.His theory: The North had the burden of conquering the South, a huge defensible area consisting of eleven states. The South only had to play for a tie and only had to wear down the northern will to win (as insurgents did against superior forces in the American Revolution, the Chinese Communist takeover of China, and the Vietnam War). Specifically, the South had to hold on to its precious manpower resources and convince the North to vote Lincoln out of office in 1864.Instead, Lee unnecessarily went for the win, squandered his irreplaceable troops, and weakened his army so badly that military defeat became inevitable. Lee's army took 80,000 casualties in his first fourteen months of command-the same number of troops he inherited when he took command. This crucial period of the war extended from the Seven Days' Campaign, in which Lee's army went on the suicidal offensive almost every day for a week; Second Bull Run/Manassas, where the final offensive

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